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We believe that the German people bear a common political responsibility for 
outrages secretly committed by the Gestapo and the SS. What are we to think of 
our own part in a program which violates every democratic social value, yet has 
been approved by the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court? 
—Eugene V. Rostow1 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade 
Center towers, governmental policies as well as private actors overtly targeted 
Arab Americans, Muslims, and those of (or perceived to be of) Middle Eastern 
and South Asian descent.2 These developments prompted concern that the 
United States’ so-called War on Terror3 would be used to justify a large-scale 
internment of civilians on the basis of their race, ethnicity, national origin, or 
religion, along the lines of the internment of Japanese Americans during World 
War II.4 Arab Americans and Muslims living in the United States were not, 
however, incarcerated en masse, and many civil libertarians breathed a collective 
sigh of relief. 
Was this relief warranted? Did the legal, political, and educational efforts to 
discredit the Japanese American internment bear fruit in post-9/11 America? To 
understand the extent to which the dangers represented by the Japanese 
American internment are still with us, we must first consider what it is about the 
internment that we find most problematic, and then evaluate the extent to which 
those dangers have been minimized or intensified in the post-9/11 era. Part I of 
this Article briefly reviews critiques of the World War II internment and adapts a 
framework articulated by Yale law professor Eugene Rostow in 1945 as a lens 
through which to assess contemporary developments. 
Part II discusses how the executive’s power to act unilaterally to detain and 
otherwise infringe on the most basic human and constitutional rights of persons 
under U.S. jurisdiction has been dramatically expanded in the name of national 
security. Congress, for the most part, has passed legislation which enables, rather 
than constrains, these programs of detention and interrogation, and the Supreme 
Court has provided limited restrictions, primarily preserving the right of the 
courts to review petitions for habeas corpus but indicating a willingness to defer 
to the executive in much the same manner as it did in deciding the Japanese 
American internment cases.  
 
 1. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 533 (1945). 
 2. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE 
WAR ON TERRORISM 17–71 (2003). See generally Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 
11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (2004) (discussing race-based violence in 
both public and private sectors). 
 3. As early as September 12, 2001, President George W. Bush had framed the U.S. response to 
the attacks as “the first wave of the war against terrorism.” See Stephen P. Marks, Branding the “War 
on Terrorism”: Is There a “New Paradigm” of International Law? 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 71, 71 (2006). The 
Obama administration has attempted to steer away from use of the term, with limited success. See 
David C. Morrison, Behind the Lines: Our Take on the Other Media’s Homeland Security, CQ HOMELAND 
SEC., April 6, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 6802932; Kevin Howe, Words redefine “war on terror,” 
MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, June 9, 2009, at A1. 
 4. See, e.g., Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After 
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 337 (2002); 
Laurence Tribe, Military Tribunals Undermine the Constitution, COUNTERPUNCH, Dec. 8, 2001, available 
at http://www.counterpunch.org/ltribe1.html. See generally Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The 
Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 307 (2006). 
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Part III considers whether focusing on the relationship between the U.S. 
government’s policies during World War II and in the post-9/11 era will result in 
any concrete change, or whether we are simply documenting another iteration of 
a pattern that has permeated U.S. history. Striking similarities exist between 
measures now taken in the name of fighting terrorism, the internment of 
Japanese Americans, and the U.S. government’s long history of incarcerating 
people on charges of sedition or “disloyalty.”5 The Article concludes that for this 
information to be of any consequence, the issue of individual and governmental 
accountability must be confronted. 
II.  THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT: “OVERRULED IN THE COURT OF 
HISTORY”?6 
A.  Acknowledgment of a Wrong 
In 1944 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Fred Korematsu for 
violating the military orders excluding Japanese Americans from the West Coast. 
Relying upon the logic it had earlier invoked to uphold the convictions of 
Gordon Hirabayashi and Minoru Yasui for violating a curfew imposed upon 
Japanese Americans, the Supreme Court refused to “reject as unfounded the 
judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal 
members of that population. . . . [who] could not readily be isolated and 
separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and 
safety.” 7 While the Court purported to be ruling solely on the legality of the 
curfew and exclusion orders, it was upholding the mass internment of 
approximately 120,000 persons—old and young, U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents—on the basis of their ancestry.8 
Justice Murphy said in dissent that the exclusion policy “falls into the ugly 
abyss of racism”;9 and Justice Roberts summarized the majority’s decision as 
“convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a 
concentration camp, based on his ancestry.”10 Justice Jackson observed that “the 
Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal 
procedure and of transplanting American citizens.”11 
After decades of concerted activism, research, public education, and 
political pressure raising awareness of the injustices of the Japanese American 
 
 5. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 105–53; NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, 
FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE STATE 78–
84 (2007). 
 6. Korematsu v. United States, 584 U.S. F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the Korematsu case as having been “overruled in the court of history”). 
 7. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 
320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)); see also Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). 
 8. See generally COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 83 
(1997) [hereinafter CWRIC]; MICHI WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS 36–37 (1996). 
 9. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 11. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
Saito_cpcxns.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2010  12:22:39 PM 
74 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:71 2010 
internment, as well as renewed legal challenges, lower federal courts vacated the 
convictions of Korematsu and Hirabayashi in the 1980s.12 Acting on the findings 
of the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
(“CWRIC”), Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided an 
official apology and minimal redress to surviving internees.13 At that point there 
was widespread belief that the World War II internment of Japanese Americans 
had been legally as well as politically repudiated, despite the fact that Korematsu 
and related Supreme Court decisions upholding the internment had never been 
formally overruled, and no legislation passed clearly prohibiting such practices.14 
Vacating Korematsu’s conviction in 1984, District Judge Patel concluded 
optimistically that legal scholars and Supreme Court justices had characterized 
the Korematsu decision as an “anachronism” and that the “government 
acknowledged its concurrence with the Commission’s observation that ‘today 
the decision in Korematsu lies overruled in the court of history.’”15 
B.  Identifying the Dangers of the Internment 
Should we be concerned about the Japanese American internment being 
repeated in post-9/11 America? To assess that issue, we must first identify which 
aspects of the internment are of most concern. In 1976 President Gerald Ford 
acknowledged that the “evacuation” of Japanese was a “mistake,” stating, “We 
now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation 
wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans.”16 His 
proclamation did not, however, explain why it was wrong, except insofar as the 
military’s presumption of disloyalty had been incorrect. The text of the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988 was more specific, noting that the government’s actions 
“were carried out without adequate security reasons . . . and were motivated 
largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political 
leadership.”17 However, the Act did not address what would have constituted 
“adequate security reasons,” leaving room for judicial deference regarding future 
executive determinations of security threats. 
 
 12. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States, 584 
F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In Minoru Yasui’s case, the writ was denied and the government’s 
motion to vacate his curfew conviction granted; Yasui’s appeal of the denial was mooted by his 
death. See Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985). See generally Lorraine K. Bannai, Taking 
the Stand: The Lessons of Three Men Who Took the Japanese American Internment to Court, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR 
SOC. JUST. 1 (2005); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933 
(2004) (discussing these challenges to the Supreme Court’s internment decisions of the 1940s). 
 13. See CWRIC, supra note 8; Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988). 
 14. See Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 
571, 586 (2002) (noting that “[e]ight of the nine currently sitting Justices on the Court have either 
written or concurred in opinions describing Korematsu as an error”); see also David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 993 (2002). But see Jerry Kang, Watching the Watchers: Enemy Combatants in the 
Internment’s Shadow, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 278 n.128 (2005) (explaining why “we should be 
cautious about reading too much into the cases that Muller cites”). 
 15. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
 16. Gerald R. Ford, Proclamation No. 4417, “An American Promise,” (Feb. 20, 1976), reproduced in 
ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT 400 (2001). 
 17. See Civil Liberties Act, supra note 13, § 2(a). 
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Much of the criticism of the internment has focused on “racial profiling”: 
specifically the presumption made by the military and sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court that Japanese Americans, unlike German or Italian Americans, 
could be presumed disloyal by virtue of their national origin.18 
In a scathing critique written shortly after the Supreme Court issued the 
Korematsu decision, Eugene Rostow situated the question of racial profiling in the 
context of governmental actions which punish political belief.19 He highlighted 
the danger of acting upon (presumed) political opinion rather than criminal 
activity, particularly when the constitutional protections guaranteed to criminal 
defendants are disregarded.20 Rostow summarized the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to find the internment unconstitutional as follows: 
(1) protective custody, extending over three or four years, is a permitted form of 
imprisonment in the United States; (2) political opinions, not criminal acts, may 
contain enough clear and present danger to justify such imprisonment; (3) men, 
women and children of a given ethnic group, both Americans and resident 
aliens, can be presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas which require 
their imprisonment; (4) in time of war or emergency the military, perhaps 
without even the concurrence of the legislature, can decide what political 
opinions require imprisonment, and which ethnic groups are infected with them; 
and (5) the decision of the military can be carried out without indictment, trial, 
examination, jury, the confrontation of witnesses, counsel for the defense, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, or any of the other safeguards of the Bill of 
Rights.21 
Because this articulation incorporates both the problems of racially-based 
governmental policies and the dangers inherent to giving the executive branch 
unfettered power in matters of national security, I have elected to employ 
Rostow’s framework—adapting it to focus on executive assertions of power—in 
comparing the U.S. government’s conduct of its War on Terror with its 
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. 
III. ASSESSING THE WAR ON TERROR THROUGH THE INTERNMENT LENS 
This Article focuses on the Japanese American internment’s establishment 
of a significant precedent for the unconstrained exercise of executive power. The 
executive branch now invokes “national security” to imprison or to impair 
significantly the rights of U.S. citizens and non-citizen residents on the basis of 
 
 18. See Eric L. Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the Internment’s True Legacy, 1 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 108 (2003). 
 19. See generally Rostow, supra note 1. This is often referred to as the authoritative or seminal 
critique of the internment cases. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the 
Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 921 (2009) (reviewing BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND 
THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008)); A. John Radsan, Second-
Guessing the Spymasters with a Judicial Role in Espionage Deals, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1259, 1302 n.178 (2006). 
An October 2009 search of legal journals yielded ninty-seven references to Rostow’s article, but only a 
handful examined his arguments in any detail, one such exception being Philip Tajitsu Nash, Moving 
for Redress, 94 YALE L.J. 743, 746–48 (1985) (reviewing JOHN TATEISHI, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: AN ORAL 
HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN DETENTION CAMPS (1984)). 
 20. See Rostow, supra note 1, at 532. 
 21. Id. 
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political opinion, rather than criminal activity, presuming in that process that 
ethnicity or national origin is reliably correlated to political belief. The next 
sections consider the extent to which the following have been deemed acceptable 
in post-9/11 America: (A) domestic internment of both citizens and non-citizens, 
without otherwise applicable constitutional safeguards; (B) imprisonment for 
political beliefs—whether explicitly or as a result of the indirect criminalization 
of such beliefs; (C) the presumed correlation of political ideology with particular 
ethnic or national origin groups; and (D) the expansion of unilateral executive 
power to accomplish these ends in the name of national security. 
A. Detentions Without Constitutional Safeguards  
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. government officials appeared to 
consider implementing a domestic internment program in the name of national 
security. The Justice Department disappeared and detained thousands of non-
citizens, many of them permanent residents, holding them indefinitely without 
charge and interrogating them without access to counsel.22 Initially, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft announced the rising number of these “terrorism 
suspects,” but refused to disclose who was in custody, where they were being 
held, or whether they had been charged with crimes.23 
When a coalition of human rights and civil liberties organizations filed a 
request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),24 the Justice 
Department announced that it would no longer release even the number of those 
detained.25 In the meantime, the Attorney General had issued a directive 
cautioning federal agency and department heads against releasing information 
pursuant to FOIA requests.26 
We do know that the Justice Department ultimately incarcerated over 5000 
individuals allegedly suspected of terrorism, and that while only a handful were 
charged with terrorism-related offenses, hundreds were subsequently 
deported.27 Like the Japanese American internment, this program indefinitely 
detained a large number of persons in the name of “national security,” while 
investigating the equivalent of their “loyalty.” The criteria for arrest were never 
 
 22. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
 23. See David Cole, No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional 
Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1341 (2008) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, 
TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS (2007)); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under 
Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 72–73 (2005). 
 24. Freedom of Information Act Pub. L. No. 89–487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). 
 25. See Letter to Melanie Ann Pustay, Office of Information and Privacy, Department of Justice, 
Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.cnss.org/dojfoia.htm (request for information); Amy 
Goldstein and Dan Eggen, U.S. to Stop Issuing Detention Tallies, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A16; 
Memorandum, John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies, 
Oct. 12, 2001, available at http://news.lp.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/ashcroft-foia-
memo10122001.pdf. 
 26. See Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (2003), 
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
 27. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 25–26; NANCY CHANG, 
SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: HOW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 69 (2002). 
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specified, but it appears that immigration status, country of origin, and religious 
or political association played a primary role in the selection of detainees.28 
Some officials also considered interning U.S. citizens post-9/11. In July 2002, 
U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner Peter Kirsanow predicted that there may be a 
“return to Korematsu,“ suggesting Arab Americans might be interned en masse if 
the United States suffered another major terrorist attack.29 In February 2003, 
Howard Coble, head of the House Subcommittee on Terrorism and Domestic 
Security, said that the decision to intern Japanese Americans during World War 
II had been appropriate.30 Coble denied supporting mass incarceration of Arab 
Americans, yet said that some Japanese Americans “probably were intent on 
doing harm to us, just as some of these Arab-Americans are probably intent on 
doing harm to us.”31 The less-than-enthusiastic public responses to these 
initiatives may have sent the message that mass civilian detention programs 
were not feasible, at least if conducted in such a public manner.32 
Somewhat more successful was Attorney General John Ashcroft’s vision of 
internment via military tribunals. In 2002, he announced that the government 
was considering plans to reinstitute “detention centers” for U.S. citizens deemed 
“enemy combatants” based on the threat they posed to national security.33 The 
cases of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla illustrate34 that the executive branch was 
more than willing to label U.S. citizens in this manner, detaining them as Rostow 
warned, without any of the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.35 In both 
cases, the government argued that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force justified the detention of U.S. citizens, whether captured in a war zone or 
arrested on U.S. soil, and the Supreme Court upheld these individualized 
internments.36 
On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued an Executive 
Order authorizing military tribunals to try persons believed to be associated with 
 
 28. See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Emil Guillermo, Dangerous Talk, S.F. CHRON., July 30, 2002, http://www.sfgate.com/ cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2002/07/30/eguillermo.DTL; Press Release, Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., ADC Update: ADC Calls for the Removal of U.S. Civil Rights Commissioner 
(July 20, 2002), available at http://www.bintjbeil.com/adc/020720_kirsanow.html. 
 30. See California Legislature Rebukes N.C.’s Coble; Congressman Offended by Saying Internment Was 
to Protect Japanese, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 3, 2003, at 2B. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See infra notes 210–213 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Jonathan Turley, Camps for Citizens: Ashcroft’s Hellish Vision, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at 
B11. 
 34. See generally Sarah A. Whalin, National Security Versus Due Process: Korematsu Raises Its Ugly 
Head Sixty Years Later in Hamdi and Padilla, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 711 (2006); Chris K. Iijima, Shooting 
Justice Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Abdication at the Convergence of Korematsu and 
McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109 (2004). 
 35. See Rostow, supra note 1, at 532. 
 36. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107–40 (2001); see also Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality agreeing that the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
authorized detention of a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th 
Cir. 2005), cert denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (holding that the government could detain U.S. citizens 
arrested in the United States as “enemy combatants”). Padilla was ultimately indicted on criminal 
charges. See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Presumption of Guilt: The Unlawful Enemy Combatant and the U.S. War 
on Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 539, 546–47 (2009). 
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al Qaeda without indictment, jury, or the ability to bring petitions for habeas 
corpus or otherwise appeal their convictions to regularly constituted courts.37 
These tribunals were to be applicable only to non-citizens; however, in many 
significant respects the relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights have been 
interpreted to apply to all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.38 If measures 
targeting non-citizens are constitutional, then they could easily be extended. 
Furthermore, history demonstrates that the initial targeting of non-citizens often 
paves the way, politically, for extending repressive measures to citizens. 
Citizenship status does not appear to have had a significant impact on the 
government’s decision to label persons suspected of terrorism as “enemy 
combatants” or to bring charges against them in military, rather than civilian, 
courts.39 The government avoided resolving the question of the constitutionality 
of treating citizens in this manner by transferring Padilla to the civilian judicial 
system, where he was convicted on criminal charges, and releasing and 
deporting Hamdi in exchange for renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.40 
For most non-citizens, such as the nearly 800 men and boys once held at 
Guantánamo Bay,41 the central legal question has been whether they can be 
detained indefinitely without due process or review of “enemy combatant” 
status. Initially, the Supreme Court may have hoped Congress would step in to 
ensure that such detentions complied at least minimally with the United States’ 
 
 37. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terror, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (November 13, 2001). See also John W. 
Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security:” A Constitutional 
Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 
1081, 1120 (2002). 
 38. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 72–82, 129–53; see, e.g., Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (applying Fourteenth Amendment equal protection to non-
citizens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (applying Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
protections to non-citizens facing criminal charges); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (applying 
Fifth Amendment due process protections to non-citizen); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) 
(finding that permanent residents have First Amendment rights); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 
U.S. 590 (1953) (finding a non-citizen a “person” under the Fifth Amendment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982) (holding that children of undocumented immigrants have a right to public education 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (denying Fourth Amendment protection to nonresident aliens 
outside of United States, and appearing to limit, in dicta, constitutional protections to non-citizens 
with “previous significant voluntary connection with the United States”). 
 39. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and We the People After September 11, 66 ALBANY 
L. REV. 413 (2003) (arguing that citizenship does matter, but that anti-terrorism measures targeting 
non-citizens also affect citizens). 
 40. See supra notes 34, 36. On Hamdi’s release, see A. John Radsan, Irregular Rendition’s Variation 
on a Theme by Hamdi, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 608–09 (2008). See generally Saad Gul, Return 
of the Native? An Assessment of the Citizenship Renunciation Clause in Hamdi’s Settlement Agreement in the 
Light of Citizenship Jurisprudence, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 131 (2007). The Supreme Court did find in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), that due process required a U.S. citizen being held as an enemy 
combatant to be given “meaningful opportunity” to contest the basis of his detention, but did not 
require adherence to the full range of constitutional protections. 
 41. See Melissa A. Jamison, The Sins of the Father: Punishing Children in the War on Terror, 29 U. LA 
VERNE L. REV. 88, 98–99 (2008) (putting the approximate number of detainees at 775, and noting that 
between six and sixty were under the age of eighteen when detained). 
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legal obligations,42 but Congress instead denied habeas review to the 
Guantánamo detainees by passing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”),43 
and the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”),44 which applied the DTA 
retroactively and authorized military trials with drastically limited provisions for 
due process. 
The Supreme Court ultimately held in Boumediene v. Bush that the MCA 
unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus and that the detainees 
had the right to bring habeas petitions to federal court even though they were 
being held outside the formal territorial boundaries of the United States.45 The 
Boumediene majority asserted that “[w]here a person is detained by executive 
order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a court, the need for 
collateral review is most pressing” and that the court “must have sufficient 
authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the 
executive’s power to detain.”46 
Viewed through the lens of the dangers illustrated by the Japanese 
American internment, it may be said that the Supreme Court stepped in to 
preserve its jurisdiction, thereby preventing the executive branch from expanding 
the power to intern confirmed in Korematsu. The Court gave no indication, 
however, that the government’s rationale for internment would be scrutinized 
any more thoroughly than it was in the World War II cases, and failed to address 
the status of those detained either in prisons in territories occupied by U.S. forces 
or in secret locations in third countries.47 
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order 
mandating that the Guantánamo detention facilities be closed within a year.48 But 
in his May 21, 2009 “Remarks by the President on National Security,” he 
distinguished between those detainees who would be (1) charged and tried in 
U.S. criminal courts, (2) tried by military commissions, (3) released pursuant to 
 
 42. See Martin J. Katz, Guantánamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President 
Meets the Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMM. 377, 420–21 (citing, for example, Justice Breyer’s invitation 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) to the president to ask Congress for the legislative 
authority to create military commissions); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (recognizing 
detainee’s right to petition for habeas corpus). 
 43. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005). 
 44. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 45. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008); on the issues of extraterritoriality, see id. at 2251–
58. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and National Security, 25 TOURO L. REV. 577 
(2009) (providing context for the Boumediene decision); see also Katz, supra note 42, at 377–78, 418–20 
(2009) (citing Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2275; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507, 520–21; and Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466, 
485 (on the length and indeterminacy of the detentions)). 
 46. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2269. 
 47. See European Parliament, Report on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the 
transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
comparl/tempcom/tdip/final_report_en.pdf (especially paragraph 42, noting the use of at least 1245 
flights operated by the CIA between 2001 and 2005, as well as an unspecified number of military 
flights transporting detainees). See generally Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: 
Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333 (2007); David Weissbrodt & 
Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123 (2006). 
 48. Exec. Order – Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
_press_office/ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities. 
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court orders, (4) transferred to other countries, and (5) those “who cannot be 
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people.”49 The last 
category is the most problematic. The president said of this group, “We must 
recognize that these detention policies cannot be unbounded. They can’t be 
based simply on what I or the executive branch decide alone. That’s why my 
administration has begun to reshape the standards that apply to ensure that they 
are in line with the rule of law. . . .”50 This statement is troubling for several 
reasons. Lawful detention exists only for those subject to criminal prosecution or 
incarceration as prisoners of war—that was the underlying problem with the 
Japanese American internment. Obama emphasized the need for “fair 
procedure,”51 but what can this mean if there are no articulable grounds for 
lawful confinement? Finally, after acknowledging that the decision should not be 
made by the executive alone, the president proposed only that his 
administration—i.e., the executive branch—would develop new standards. 
At this point, it is difficult to discern how the Bush or Obama 
administrations’ policies on the War on Terror differ significantly from those of 
the Roosevelt administration during World War II.52 Federal authorities now 
have numerous means “to effectuate preventive detention after 9/11,” among 
these “immigration law, the material witness statute, broad criminal statutes 
penalizing material support of terrorist groups, and the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force.”53 They have used these powers to detain thousands of persons 
for months and years, in the absence of evidence that they posed any threat to 
national security, and without charging them with crimes.54 It is quite clear that 
today, as in the Japanese American internment, “protective custody, extending 
over three or four years, is [still] a permitted form of imprisonment in the United 
States,”55 and continues to be imposed without regard for those provisions of the 
Bill of Rights applicable to persons being prosecuted for crimes. 
B. Penalizing (Presumed) Political Opinions and Political Expression 
In the Japanese American internment cases, the Supreme Court accepted the 
government’s argument that mass incarceration was required as a matter of 
“military necessity” because there was no way of distinguishing “loyal” from 
 
 49. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on National Security 
(May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-
President-On-National-Security-5-21-09. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. As of mid-October 2009, only twelve prisoners held at Guantánamo Bay had actually been 
released, and there were reports that the U.S. prison at the Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan was 
to be expanded. See Warren Richey, Obama’s Guantánamo, Counterterror Policies Similar to Bush’s? 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 15, 2009), at 2; see also Eisuke Suzuki, A Samurai’s Confessions: Obama’s 
Realism Mirrors Bush’s Policy, BUS. RECORDER (May 27, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 9980116. 
 53. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. 
REV. 693, 698 (2009). 
 54. Id. at 703–06. 
 55. Rostow, supra note 1, at 532. 
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“disloyal” individuals of Japanese ancestry.56 Internment for disloyalty, in the 
absence of some concrete criminal act through which such disloyalty is 
manifested, is imprisonment on the basis of political opinion.57 The punishment 
of political opinion—actual or presumed—in the current War on Terror can be 
seen in measures that blur the lines between intelligence-gathering and criminal 
investigations, as well as those that expand the definition of criminal activity to 
include conduct protected by the First Amendment. 
1.  Punishing Political Opinion: A Brief History 
The U.S. government has a long history of criminalizing political opinion, 
beginning with the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts,58 passed amidst claims by the 
Federalists that Jeffersonians were attempting to impose the French Revolution’s 
“Reign of Terror” on the United States.59 In 1917 the Justice Department 
attempted to convince President Woodrow Wilson to use military courts martial 
to try civilians accused of interfering with the war effort.60 This attempt proved 
unsuccessful, but Congress did pass an Espionage Act making it illegal to 
“willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive language” about the United States.61 This was followed by the 1918 
Sedition Act, which prohibited virtually all criticism of the U.S. government or its 
war effort.62 
The security rationale has been invoked in times of peace as well as war. J. 
Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), began 
compiling investigative files on millions of Americans in 1924,63 and by 1940 had 
announced his intention to create an index which would enable the FBI to locate 
immediately any person wanted for “national security” reasons,64 even though 
the Justice Department was not authorized to investigate the activities of citizens 
who had not violated federal law.65 The Smith Act of 1940 made it a crime to 
“knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity, 
desirability or propriety” of overthrowing the government or assassinating 
 
 56. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214. See generally Rostow, supra note 1; Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu 
Revisited—Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a 
Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 57. See Rostow, supra note 1, at 532. 
 58. Alien Enemy Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000)); Sedition 
Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); on the Alien Enemy Act. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, 
War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 NYU L. REV. 1402 (1992). 
 59. See RICHARD O. CURRY, FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION IN THE 
1980S 5 (1988). 
 60. See SANFORD J. UNGAR, FBI 41–42 (1976). 
 61. See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917); see also ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, 
POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA FROM 1870 TO 1976, at 108 (2001). 
 62. See Sedition Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918); see also Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214 
(1919); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918); Edward J. Bloustein, Criminal Attempts and the 
“Clear and Present Danger” Theory of the First Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1125–27 (1989). 
 63. See UNGAR, supra note 60, at 48–49. 
 64. See WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI’S SECRET WARS 
AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT 26–29 (2d ed. 2002); 
UNGAR, supra note 60, at 103. 
 65. See UNGAR, supra note 60, at 49. 
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government officials.66 In 1947, President Harry S. Truman issued an executive 
order authorizing the Justice Department to investigate “infiltration of disloyal 
persons” within the government and to create a list of subversive organizations 
in the United States.67 
The Emergency Detention Act, passed as part of the Internal Security Act of 
1950 (“The McCarran Act”), sanctioned mass internment by requiring all 
members of “communist front” organizations to register with the federal 
government and authorizing the creation of detention centers to incarcerate 
those registrants upon presidential declaration of an “internal security 
emergency.”68 In 1971 this was superceded by a provision that “[n]o citizen shall 
be imprisoned or otherwise detained except pursuant to an Act of Congress,”69 
which constrains unilateral executive action, but does not preclude such 
detentions. 
After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration quickly limited the 
protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in ways likely to penalize political 
beliefs or associations. Some of the most dramatic measures were included in the 
USA PATRIOT Act, which significantly expanded the power of law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies.70 Among other things, the USA PATRIOT Act 
authorizes the government “to detain any non-citizen terrorism suspect without 
charges, albeit for a short period of time.”71 Such suspects are identified broadly 
to include persons “engaged in any . . . activity that endangers the national 
security of the United States.”72 
2. Conflating Intelligence and Criminal Investigations 
 Since 2001, anti-terrorist legislation has blurred the lines between “foreign 
intelligence gathering” and criminal investigations, and expanded the powers of 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.73 To give just a few examples, the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”)74 and the Wiretap Act of 
196875 were amended to allow, among other things, geographically unrestricted 
 
 66. Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940); see also MICHAEL LINFIELD, 
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR 75–79 (1990). 
 67. CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 64, at 32. 
 68. Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950), Pub. L. No. 
81–831, 64 Stat. 987, 1019–31 (1950) (repealed in 1971). See generally Masumi Izumi, Alienable 
Citizenship Race, Loyalty and the Law in the Age of “American Concentration Camps,” 1941-1971, 13 ASIAN 
AM. L.J. 1 (2006) (documenting the use of the Japanese American internment as a model for the 
Emergency Detention Act). 
 69. Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971). See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Case 
Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505, 521 (2009). 
 70. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter 
USA PATRIOT Act]; see generally Heather Hillary & Nancy Kubasek, The Remaining Perils of the Patriot 
Act: A Primer, 8 J. L.  SOC’Y 1 (2007). 
 71. Vladeck, The Case Against National Security Courts, supra note 69, at 521. 
 72. Id.; see also USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 70, § 412. 
 73. See Whitehead & Aden supra note 37, at 1101–13 (2002); see also CHANG, supra note 27. 
 74. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub.L. No. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (amended 2008). 
 75. Wiretap Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197, 211–23 (1968) (passed as Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act). 
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(“roving”) wiretap warrants against unspecified persons, tracking of telephone 
and internet calls without notice, expanded access to voicemail messages and e-
mail communications, the ability to subpoena financial and business records 
without notice to the targeted parties, and “sneak and peek” warrants of homes 
or offices without prior notification.76 These developments are significant both 
because they allow the government to gather more information on the activities 
of U.S. citizens and residents, thereby chilling constitutionally protected speech 
and association,77 and because “intelligence,” which focuses on political beliefs 
and associations, now serves as the basis for criminal prosecutions or indefinite 
detentions without trial. 
The USA PATRIOT Act also expanded the definition of “foreign intelligence 
information.” Rather than being defined in terms of attacks, sabotage, or 
espionage by agents of foreign powers, it now encompasses “information 
whether or not concerning a U.S. person, with respect to a foreign power or 
foreign territory that relates to (i) the national defense or the security of the 
United States; or (ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.”78 
Under this definition, the opinion of any American citizen or permanent resident 
concerning any aspect of U.S. foreign policy could qualify as “foreign intelligence 
information” susceptible to investigation by governmental authorities. 
As Jude McCulloch and Sharon Pickering observe, the rationale for 
gathering and sharing such information is based upon a law enforcement model 
which attempts to prevent crime by criminalizing “pre-crime” activity: “Counter-
terrorism pre-crime measures envisage specific serious harms and criminalize 
those whom it is believed will commit these imaginary future harms.”79 
Furthermore, the anticipated crimes at issue are framed in terms of “national 
security,” an inherently politicized construct.80 This politicization is illustrated by 
the United States’ long history of using intelligence agencies to repress the lawful 
activities of individuals and organizations perceived to threaten the status quo, 
and the documented record of having manipulated criminal prosecutions to 
further political aims.81 
In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church (the 
“Church Committee”), held numerous hearings and issued a four-volume report 
 
 76. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 70, §§ 201, 202, 206, 207, 209, 210, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 
355, 356, 358; see also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 37, at 1103–13, 1131; see generally Peter P. Swire, 
The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306 (2004); William C. 
Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147 
(2003). 
 77. See generally Linda E. Fisher, Guilt By Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and 
the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621 (2004); Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The 
Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201 (2004). 
 78. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 70, § 214. 
 79. Jude McCulloch & Sharon Pickering, Imagining Future Crime in the “War on Terror,” 49 BRIT. J. 
CRIM. 628, 629 (2009). 
 80. See id. at 630; see generally Fisher, supra note 77; Eric Lardiere, The Justiciability and 
Constitutionality of Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 UCLA L. REV. 976 (1983). 
 81. See Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General, 642 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and 
the Unlawful Repression of Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1084–86 (2002). 
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documenting thousands of illegal and unconstitutional operations engaged in by 
federal agencies such as the FBI and CIA over several decades with the explicit 
intent of destroying and discrediting social and political movements they 
considered a threat to the status quo.82 The Church Committee recommended 
several remedial measures, including strictly separating the gathering of 
domestic and foreign intelligence and applying the equivalent of a reasonable 
suspicion standard to terrorism investigations.83 These recommendations have 
not been meaningfully implemented, and the government has moved in 
precisely the opposite direction in the current War on Terror.84 
There is also considerable evidence that local police forces, often working 
with federal agencies through Joint Terrorism Task Force agreements, have been 
gathering political intelligence on activists for many decades.85 In March 2002, for 
example, the American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado discovered that the 
Intelligence Bureau of the Denver Police Department had extensive files on over 
3000 individuals and more than 200 organizations.86 These contained information 
on organizational membership, attendance at meetings, attendance at political 
rallies, descriptions of individuals’ homes and vehicles, bumper stickers and t-
shirts, but virtually nothing connecting the surveillance targets to any criminal 
activity.87 Grossly inaccurate information—such as the depiction of the Nobel 
peace prize-winning American Friends Service Committee as a “criminal 
extremist” organization—had been disseminated to dozens of intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies.88 As Mark Cohen, subject of one of the files, observes, 
When intelligence is gathered in a criminal case, presumably the information can 
be traced to a specific source, and the defendant will have a chance to refute it 
when the case is prosecuted. However, when it is gathered solely for intelligence 
purposes and widely disseminated . . . . [t]argeted individuals and 
organizations . . . may never know why certain punitive actions are taken against 
them, and may be unable to locate and thereby discredit the source of false 
accusations.89 
 
 82. See Saito, Whose Liberty, supra note 81, at 1078–1104. See generally Senate Select Comm. to 
Study Gov’t Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Intelligence Activities 
and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); WARD CHURCHILL & JIM 
VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST 
DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2002). 
 83. See William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1226 (2007); Fisher, supra note 
77, at 665. 
 84. See Saito, Whose Liberty, supra note 81, at 1104–11. 
 85. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d 787 F.2d 828 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (limiting the political surveillance activities of the New York Police Department); Mark 
Cohen, Report from the Field: The Denver Spy Files, The New Centennial Review, Vol. 6:1, 95–101 (2006); 
related documents are available at http://www.aclu-co.org/spyfiles/documents.htm (accessed 
October 11, 2009). 
 86. See Cohen, supra note 85, at 96. 
 87. Id. at 95–96. 
 88. Id. at 95–97. 
 89. Id. at 99. See also Rebecca K. Smith, “Ecoterrorism”?: A Critical Analysis of the Vilification of 
Radical Environmental Activists as Terrorists, 38 ENVTL. L. 537, 565 (2008) (noting the inclusion of 
anarchists and environmental and animal rights activists as “potential terrorists” in the National 
Crime Information Center’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, an electronic database 
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The dangers articulated by Cohen are sharply illustrated by the case of 
Maher Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, who was detained by U.S. 
immigration officials while changing planes in New York City in 2002. 
“Rendered” to Syria, Arar was held for nearly a year in a tiny underground cell, 
interrogated, and tortured before being returned to Canada.90 An official 
Canadian inquiry concluded that there was no evidence linking Arar to any 
terrorist activity or organization,91 but did find that U.S. authorities had probably 
relied upon grossly inaccurate information provided by the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (“RCMP”) in deciding to detain and render Arar.92 Further, the 
commission concluded that the RCMP’s false descriptions were likely a 
byproduct of blurring the lines of responsibility between the RCMP, trained to 
engage in criminal prosecutions, and the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service.93 
As Diane Amann observes, blurring the distinction between surveillance 
and punishment transforms detention from “a way to secure presence for trial or 
absence from battle until war ends” into “a way to assure custodial interrogation 
unfettered by the niceties of legal process.”94 Put another way, it is a method for 
detaining, questioning, or otherwise intimidating and punishing people on the 
basis of information or presumptions about their political views or associations, 
rather than evidence of criminal activity. 
 3.  Criminalizing Dissent 
The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act authorized the 
secretary of state to list “foreign terrorist organizations”—much like the list of 
“subversive” organizations authorized by President Truman in 1947—and made 
provision of material support to such groups a felony, even if the aid supports 
entirely lawful activities.95 The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act expanded these 
measures by creating a new “terrorist exclusion list,” expanding the definition of 
 
created without notice to designated persons and available to a wide range of law enforcement 
agencies). 
 90. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp.2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of Maher Arar, 29 REV. LITIG. 479, 482–
484 (2008). 
 91. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (2006), available at http://publications.gc.ca/ 
pub?id=298241&sl=0; see also Lobel, supra note 90, at 485. 
 92. See Julian N. Falconer & Sunil S. Mathai, The Anti-Terrorism Act and the Arar Findings: 
Democracy Protected or Democracy Eroded?, 21 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 49, 58 (2006). 
 93. Id. at 61 (quoting Commission of Inquiry, supra note 91, Vol. I at 68). 
 94. Diane Marie Amann, Punish or Surveil, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 873, 873 (2007). 
 95. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), 8 
U.S.C. §1189(a); see DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 119–23 (2d ed. 2002); William C. 
Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 109 
(2000). See generally David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties 
Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247 (1996) (describing dangers in anti-
terrorism bills subsequently enacted as Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act). 
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“terrorist” organizations, and increasing the penalty for providing material 
support to designated organizations.96 
The USA PATRIOT Act targeted citizens more directly by creating the crime 
of “domestic terrorism,” broadly defined to encompass “acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
State,” which “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States,” and which, among other things, are intended to “influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion.”97 The Homeland Security Act of 2003 
extended the definition of “terrorism” to include not only acts “dangerous to 
human life” but also those “potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or 
key resources.”98 Political protest of any governmental policy can now constitute 
domestic terrorism if minor laws are broken and life, infrastructure, or resources 
are endangered. Association is also penalized by the “material support” 
provisions of these laws.99 Attempts to criminalize political opinion have not 
been limited to those associated with organizations linked, however tangentially, 
to foreign terrorist organizations. Environmental and animal rights activists have 
been labeled “terrorists” and their organizations surveilled and infiltrated.100 In 
2002 the Domestic Terrorism Section Chief of the FBI’s Counterterrorism 
Division defined “ecoterrorism” as “the use or threatened use of violence of a 
criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-
oriented subnational group for environmental-political reasons” and testified 
that the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front were the FBI’s 
top priority in terms of domestic terrorism.101 The broad scope of this definition 
and the application of the “terrorism” label to conduct which is criminalized 
specifically on the basis of an underlying “environmental-political” motivation 
establishes the nexus between terrorism prosecutions and political belief quite 
straightforwardly.102 Such definitions of “terrorist activity” also preclude 
 
 96. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 70,  §§ 805, 810(d); see COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 95, at 153. 
See generally Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 
2005) (upholding designation and blocking of assets of group identified as a global terrorist 
organization). 
 97. USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 70, § 802(a). 
 98. Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002); see 6 U.S.C. § 101 (2007) 
(noting the current definition). 
 99. See USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 70,  § 805; Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 53, at 704. 
But see Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 49, 77 USLW 3679, and 78 USLW 3059 (U.S. Sept. 30, 
2009) (finding that the ban on material support did not impose guilt by association and was unlikely 
to substantially chill constitutionally protected speech). See generally Tasia E. McIntyer, Protecting 
Against Terrorism or Symbolic Politics? Fatal Flaws in Ohio’s Criminal Terrorism Statute, 43 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 203 (2005) (noting the dangers in parallel state legislation). 
 100. See Smith, “Ecoterrorism?” supra note 89, at 571–75. 
 101. Id. at 553, citing Eco-terrorism and Lawlessness on the National Forests: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Forests and Forest Health of the H. Resources Comm., 107th Cong. 107–83 (testimony 
of James F. Jarboe); see also Jared S. Goodman, Shielding Corporate Interests from Public Dissent: An 
Examination of the Undesirability and Unconstitutionality of “Eco-Terrorism” Legislation, 16 J. L. & POL. 
832, 833 (2008). 
 102. See generally Dara Lovitz, Animal Lovers and Tree Huggers Are the New Cold-Blooded Criminals?: 
Examining the Flaws of Ecoterrorism Bills, 3 J. ANIMAL L. 79 (2007); Ethan Carson Eddy, Privatizing the 
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recognition of armed struggle as a potentially legitimate means of realizing the 
internationally acknowledged right of all peoples to self-determination.103 In 
other words, as John Alan Cohan observes, the USA PATRIOT Act’s definition of 
domestic terrorism “does not clearly distinguish terrorism from legitimate forms 
of political violence.”104 For similar reasons, Robert Odawi Porter notes that it 
threatens American Indian nations by eliminating—or at least deterring—their 
ability “to engage in ‘disobedient’ actions against the colonizing government in 
order to protect and defend their inherent and treaty-recognized rights.”105 
Although this strategy may be the only one remaining to American Indians 
struggling to exercise their sovereignty and ensure their survival as Indigenous 
peoples, with the advent of the War on Terror, such actions may now be deemed 
terrorism rather than legitimate forms of political protest.106 As Porter notes, “If 
the United States can justify taking control of Afghanistan and Iraq in the name 
of national security, it certainly seems true that arresting an entire Indian 
nation—if need be—would not be out of the question.”107 
In summary, it is clear that the expansion of intelligence and police powers, 
combined with an increasingly elastic definition of terrorism, have rendered the 
possibility of imprisonment—possibly mass incarceration—on the basis of 
political belief a very real danger in the current War on Terror. 
C. Ethnicity (or Its Surrogates) as a Proxy for Crime 
The current War on Terror has generated much discussion about whether 
measures which target those who are (or are presumed to be) Muslim, Arab 
American, or of Middle Eastern descent, constitute discrimination based on race 
or ethnicity of the sort manifested during World War II. To invoke Eugene 
Rostow’s framing again, does the U.S. government assume that membership in a 
particular ethnic group is a valid proxy for the kinds of political opinions and 
associations presumed to justify detention? 
On February 19, 1942 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order 9066, giving military commanders the unfettered authority to “exclude” 
“any or all persons” from any “military areas” they chose to designate,108 and 
Congress imposed criminal sanctions on persons who would “enter, remain in, 
leave, or commit any act in any military area . . . contrary to the restrictions 
 
PATRIOT Act: The Criminalization of Environmental and Animal Protectionists as Terrorists, 22 PACE 
ENVT’L. L. REV. 261 (2005). 
 103. See Common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, Dec. 16, 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, Dec. 16, 1966; see also Paul R. Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: 
Bridging the Gap Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 348 (2004) (noting 
that in 2004, over one third of the groups or individuals on the Treasury Department’s list of 
“Specially Designated Global Terrorists” were associated with movements for self-determination). 
 104. John Alan Cohan, Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism, 35 STETSON L. REV. 903, 931 (2006) 
(noting that the Boston Tea Party falls well within its definition). 
 105. Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. CIV. LIBS. & CIV. RTS. 137, 138 (2006). 
 106. Id. at 170–78. 
 107. Id. at 182. 
 108. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
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applicable to such areas.”109 Federal intelligence agencies had long since created 
a list of persons to be detained in the event of war with Japan, and most of those 
identified had been arrested within seventy-two hours of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.110 Nonetheless, the orders issued by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt 
pursuant to Executive Order 9066 excluded from the West Coast “all persons of 
Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien.”111 
The government’s purported justification was that there was insufficient 
time to distinguish the “loyal” from the “disloyal,”112 i.e., in Rostow’s terms, to 
determine which Japanese Americans held “the kind of dangerous ideas which 
require their imprisonment.”113 That it was a race-based measure was starkly 
confirmed when a priest running an orphanage in Los Angeles asked Lieutenant 
Colonel Karl Bendetsen, the officer responsible for implementing the internment, 
whether it was necessary to send children of less than one-quarter Japanese 
ancestry. Bendetsen is said to have replied “that if they have one drop of 
Japanese blood in them, they must go to a camp.”114 More generally, DeWitt’s 
Final Report stated plainly that time was not an issue in assessing the loyalty of 
Japanese Americans; rather, it was simply “infeasible” to distinguish the “sheep 
from the goats” because—as he put it elsewhere—a “Jap is a Jap” and “the 
Japanese race is an enemy race.”115 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to confront such explicitly race-based 
measures can be seen in Justice Black’s majority opinion in Korematsu. 
Responding to Justice Murphy’s accusation that the Court was “fall[ing] into the 
ugly abyss of racism,”116 the majority asserted, “To cast this case into outlines of 
racial prejudice . . . merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from 
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded 
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire.”117 The majority’s logic is mind-
boggling. Other than ancestry, what could connect interned U.S. citizens to the 
military dangers posed by the Japanese Empire?118 Employing McCulloch and 
 
 109. Act of Mar 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77–503, 56 Stat 173 (1942); see also PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT 
WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 66–68 (1983). Senator Robert Taft 
(R-Ohio), the only legislator to object, observed that “this is probably the ‘sloppiest’ criminal law I 
have ever read or seen anywhere.” Id. at 68. 
 110. CWRIC, supra note 8, at 54–55 (discussing the “ABC List” compiled by the FBI and the Office 
of Naval Intelligence). On contemporaneous governmental acknowledgments that security reasons 
did not dictate mass internment, see SAITO, CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 5, at 68–70. 
 111. Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57 of May 10, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 3725 (1942). Previously, DeWitt 
had imposed a curfew on “all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry.” See Public 
Proclamation No. 3 of March 24, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942). 
 112. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 207–12; see also Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese 
American Internment as Foreign Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179, 234 (1998). 
 113. Rostow, supra note 1, at 532. 
 114. See WEGLYN, supra note 8, at 77, 291 n.1. 
 115. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 208; CWRIC, supra note 8, at 66. 
 116. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 223. 
 118. See supra notes 110–114, and accompanying text; see also LORRAINE K. BANNAI & DALE 
MINAMI, INTERNMENT DURING WORLD WAR II AND LITIGATIONS, IN ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 755, 774 (1992). 
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Pickering’s framework discussed above,119 the internment was a “pre-crime” 
measure to detain without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, except 
to the extent that national origin could be equated, legally, with such suspicion. 
The authorities assumed that at least some persons of Japanese ancestry would 
be “disloyal” and, therefore, likely to engage in espionage or sabotage. National 
origin became a proxy for criminal predisposition.120 
Similar presumptions have guided the United States’ current War on Terror. 
In 2002, the Justice Department announced that its “first and overriding priority” 
was “to prevent, detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorism while preserving 
constitutional liberties.”121 To that end, it was “engaged in an aggressive arrest 
and detention campaign of lawbreakers with a single objective: To get terrorists 
off the street before they can harm more Americans.”122 As David Cole observed, 
because “the Constitution prohibits detaining people on grounds of future 
dangerousness,” Attorney General Ashcroft “resorted instead to indirect 
methods—pretextual law enforcement.”123 
Although the government refused to disclose specifics concerning the 
thousands incarcerated by the Justice Department in the immediate wake of the 
9/11 attacks, it appears that virtually all were non-citizen men of Arab, Middle 
Eastern, or South Asian origin.124 In 2001 and again in 2004, the FBI and 
immigration authorities intensified a program of “voluntary” interviews, 
targeting some 8000 people selected on the basis of age, gender, and national 
origin.125 This appeared to be “a threshold step in the creation of intelligence 
dossiers on individuals and organizations in the Muslim and Arab 
community.”126 By May 2003 approximately 1100 non-citizens had been detained 
under the Justice Department’s Absconder Apprehension Initiative, which 
“expressly targets for prioritized deportation the 6000 Arabs and Muslims 
among the more than 300,000 foreign nationals” subject to orders of 
deportation.127 By the end of that year, another 2870 had been detained pursuant 
 
 119. See supra note 79, and accompanying text. 
 120. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 54. 
 121. Department of Justice, Unified Agenda, Dec. 9, 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 74158-01 (2002). 
 122. Id. 
 123. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
 124. See supra notes 23–28, and accompanying text. 
 125. See Ty S. Wahab Twibell, The Road to Internment: Special Registration and Other Human Rights 
Violations of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, 29 VT. L. REV. 407, 464–72 (2005); Fox Butterfield, A 
Police Force Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7. On the problems 
such interviews can later pose in the naturalization process, see Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, 
The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on Muslims in America, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 83, 88–89 
(2007). 
 126. See Chicago Area Organizations and Social Justice Activists Ask FBI to Make ‘Spy Files’ 
Public, ACLU of Ill., Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.aclu-il.org/news/press/2004/12/ 
prominent_chicago_area_organiz.shtml. On pre-9/11 targeting of Muslims and Arabs, see Susan M. 
Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
51, 52–55 (1999). 
 127. See DOJ Focusing on Removal of 6,000 Men from Al Qaeda Haven Countries, 79 No. 4 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 115 (2002); see also COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 
25. The measures taken against Japanese Americans during World War II also included deportations, 
many of which were not voluntary. See Korematsu. v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944); see also 
WEGLYN, supra note 8, at 253–65. 
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to a special registration program which applied to immigrants from “certain 
designated countries,” all of which, with the exception of North Korea, were in 
North Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia, and included persons with dual 
citizenship.128 
While these programs utilized immigration laws, they were not intended 
simply to remove “illegal aliens,” but to detain them pending investigation. 
Rather than allowing immigration judges to release detainees on bond or 
allowing the detainees to leave the country, Justice Department officials kept 
those they deemed of “special interest” in custody until the FBI had investigated 
and “cleared” them of any ties to criminal or terrorist activity.129 People detained 
on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, or national origin were imprisoned for 
pretextual reasons, presumed guilty of endangering the national security, and 
held until governmental investigators were satisfied of their innocence. This use 
of federal immigration powers to detain some 5000 persons on the pretextual 
basis of precluding threats to national security, but actually based on their 
national origin, conforms to Rostow’s warning that after Korematsu persons of 
given ethnic groups could be “presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas 
which require their imprisonment.”130 Compared to the Japanese American 
internment, the overall number of domestic internees in the War on Terror has 
been smaller and more predominantly male. The government also employed this 
strategy in World War II, initially arresting a few thousand Japanese Americans, 
predominantly although not exclusively men, on the basis of individualized 
suspicion.131 As Rostow observed, on the West Coast the policy of mass 
evacuation and internment “emerged piecemeal.”132 
In light of this history, that the government did not detain entire ethnic 
groups after the 9/11 attacks is less reassuring, especially in light of the 
widespread public hostility expressed against Muslims, Arabs, and anyone who 
might possibly “look like a terrorist.”133 Perhaps we have avoided that scenario 
thus far only because of the lack of an organized political lobby and the fact that, 
as of 2000, there were more than three million people of Arab descent living in 
the United States.134 
 
 128. See Mary M. Sevandal, Special Registration: Discrimination in the Name of National Security, 8 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 735, 737–42 (2005) (noting also that by September 30, 2003, over 290,000 Arab 
and Muslim non-citizens had been registered); Twibell, supra note 125, at 444–45. 
 129. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 30–35. Of the 2870 special 
registration detainees, only 143 were charged with crimes, “the vast majority of which were not 
terrorist-related.” Sevandal, supra note 128, at 740. 
 130. Rostow, supra note 1, at 532. 
 131. See Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 12, at 937; see also Rostow, supra note 1, at 492–93. 
 132. Rostow, supra note 1, at 495–96. He attributed its ultimate parameters to these realities: 
“German and Italian aliens were too numerous to be arrested or severely confined, and they were 
closely connected with powerful blocs of voters. There were too many Japanese Americans in Hawaii 
to be moved. The 100,000 persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast thus became the chief 
available target for the release of frustration and aggression.” Id. at 497. 
 133. See William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 
78 TUL. L. REV. 1213, 1234–40 (2004). See generally Margaret Chon, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (2005); Ahmad, supra note 2. 
 134. See Arab American Institute, Arab Americans: Demographics, available at 
www.aaiusa.org/arab-americans/22/demographics. 
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The large-scale detentions and the special registration program 
implemented post-9/11 fit particularly well into a detention model proposed in 
1986 in a secret National Security Decision Directive issued by President Ronald 
Reagan.135 Reagan’s directive authorized the creation of an interagency Alien 
Border Control Committee whose mission was to ensure that “terrorists” did not 
enter or remain in the United States.136 According to Susan Akram, one strategy 
considered by the Committee was 
to implement a “registry and processing procedure” to keep information on 
aliens in the United States. Under this proposal, the CIA, FBI, and other agencies 
were to “immediately provide” the [Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”)] with “names, nationalities and other identifying data and evidence 
relating to alien undesirables and suspected terrorists believed to be in . . . the 
U.S.”137 
Another proposal, entitled “Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A 
Contingency Plan,” suggested using immigration laws “to apprehend and detain 
aliens from designated countries—all of them, except Iran, being Arab 
countries,” and suggested “a strategy of detaining aliens apprehended ‘as a 
result of any special projects undertaken by INS.’”138 
In the context of preventive detention, “[p]re-crime laws and the coercive 
measures that travel with them mobilize prejudice around identity and lead to 
intensified politicization of policing and law.”139 Because specific evidence of 
criminal activity is not available, “‘race,’ ethnicity and religion are used as 
proxies for risk.”140 Governmental reliance upon such proxies lends credibility to 
the profiling of persons on the basis of presumed race, national origin, or religion 
by local law enforcement agencies, private businesses, and vigilante groups. As 
the courts have upheld not only the government’s programs of preventive 
detention and interrogation but the private sector’s use of similar criteria,141 
popular prejudices are reinforced and the likelihood of hate crimes increases as 
 
 135. Akram, supra note 126, at 93 (identifying the document as National Security Decision 
Directive 207). Tellingly, the directive only became public as a result of FOIA requests filed in 
conjunction with litigation concerning a group of Palestinians known as the “LA 8” whom the 
government was attempting to deport because of their criticism of U.S. foreign policy. See David 
Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J. L. & RELIG. 267, 285–86 (2000–2001). 
 136. Akram, supra note 126, at 93. On an earlier “anti-terror” campaign targeting Arabs in the 
United States during the administration of Richard Nixon, see Akram & Johnson, supra note 4, at 314. 
 137. Akram, supra note 126, at 93–94. 
 138. Id. at 94. 
 139. McCulloch & Pickering, supra note 79, at 635. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See, e.g., Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 2d 431 (2006) (granting summary 
judgment for airline in discrimination case, on the grounds that the airline’s decision to remove 
plaintiff was reasonable). See generally Elbert Lin, Case Comment, Korematsu Continued . . . Dasrath v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.N.J. 2002), 112 YALE L.J. 1911 (2003) (discussing the 
similarities between the court’s logic in assessing the threat and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Korematsu). 
Saito_cpcxns.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2010  12:22:39 PM 
92 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:71 2010 
well.142 Girardeau Spann observes that the “liberty costs” of countering terrorism 
have, in essence, been diverted onto racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.143 
D.  Expanding Executive Power, Again 
The War on Terror has been marked by the consistent expansion of 
executive power, an issue identified by Rostow as one of the most problematic 
legacies of the internment. The George W. Bush administration relied upon a 
conception of the “unitary executive” which came to mean, in Robert Sloane’s 
terms, “a broad (many would say exorbitant) scope of purportedly inherent 
executive power, the pedigree of which is frequently unclear.”144 Rather than 
restraining the executive branch, Congress has consistently passed legislation 
enabling it, and the Supreme Court has been reluctant to intervene. 
 1.  Assertions of an Executive Power to Detain and Interrogate 
The expanded version of the “unitary executive” appears on many fronts of 
the War on Terror, most visibly, perhaps, in the Bush administration’s defense of 
the torture of detainees. In the now-famous “torture memos” of August 2002, 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo and Assistant Attorney General Jay 
Bybee, both in the White House Office of Legal Counsel, argued that the conduct 
of U.S. interrogators could not be classified as a war crime because the president 
had asserted that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda,145 and that 
“courts and prosecutors should reject prosecutions that apply federal criminal 
laws to activity that is authorized pursuant to one of the President’s 
constitutional powers.”146 In other words, the power claimed by the executive 
was not to be constrained by domestic or international law.147 Nor was it to be 
checked by other branches of the federal government for “[c]ongressional 
 
 142. See Girardeau A. Spann, Terror and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 98 (2005); Akram & Johnson, 
supra note 4, at 313–36. See generally Margaret Chon, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 215 (2005). 
 143. Spann, supra note 142, at 98. Michael L. Krenn, “America’s Face to the World”: The Department 
of State, Arab-Americans, and Diversity in the Wake of 9/11, 7 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 149, 153–55 (2003); 
see also Lindsay N. Wise, People Not Equal: A Glimpse Into the Use of Profiling and the Effect a Pending 
U.N. Human Rights Committee Case May Have on United States’ Policy, 14 WASH & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 303, 305–10 (2008). See generally Dalia Hashad, Stolen Freedoms: Arabs, Muslims and South 
Asians in the Wake of Post 9/11 Backlash, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 735 (2004). 
 144. Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 341, 343–44 (2008). See generally Karl Manheim & Allan Ides, The Unitary Executive, L.A. 
LAWYER, Sept. 29, 2006, at 24 (providing historical overview of such claims); Steven G. Calabresi, The 
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002 (2007) (arguing that the executive power “vesting clause” found in Article II 
of the Constitution cannot be used, even with congressional support, to divest the Supreme Court of 
its jurisdiction under Article III). 
 145. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, 
White House Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002); see also Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 1, 3 (2009); Jordan J. Paust, Above the Law: Unlawful Executive Authorizations Regarding Detainee 
Treatment, Secret Renditions, Domestic Spying, and Claims to Unchecked Executive Power, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 345, 356–59 (2007). 
 146. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, White House 
Counsel, Aug. 1, 2002. See also Manheim & Ides, supra note 144, at 31–32. 
 147. See Manheim & Ides, supra note 144, at 32. 
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measures that would bar such practices were ruled inapplicable; interagency 
voices that contested this view were ignored.”148 
The executive branch asserted a prerogative to arbitrarily detain as well as 
interrogate.149 Using powers claimed under the immigration laws, the Justice 
Department incarcerated thousands of people in the weeks and months 
following the 9/11 attacks.150 By early 2002, prisoners captured in Afghanistan 
were being brought to hastily-constructed holding facilities at Guantánamo Bay 
to be interrogated and detained indefinitely.151 The CIA established secret 
prisons of its own, and began a process of extrajudicial rendition, sending 
persons arrested in the United States to countries where they would be tortured 
and interrogated.152 
The administration of Barack Obama has rescinded or modified some of 
these policies, but not on the grounds that they represented an unconstitutional 
extension of executive power.153 In January 2009, President Obama issued an 
Executive Order requiring that interrogations of detainees in armed conflict 
comply with Army interrogation guidelines, including the Geneva 
Conventions.154 Obama mandated the closing of the prison camp at Guantánamo 
Bay, although that promise has not been fulfilled, and he directed the CIA to 
close “as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently 
operates.”155 The president has not halted extraordinary renditions,156 precluded 
future use of military commissions, nor banned the practice of “targeted 
 
 148. Deborah Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold War World, 38 
COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 547, 574 (2007). 
 149. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Detention Power, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 181–95 (2004). See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and 
the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007). 
 150. See supra notes 27, 127–128 and accompanying text. 
 151. See Matthew Ivey, A Framework for Closing Guantánamo Bay, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 353, 
355–57 (2009). 
 152. See Robert Johnson, Extraordinary Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1135, 1136–46 (2009); Thomas F. Berndt & Alethea M. Huyser, Ghost Detainees: Does the Isolation and 
Interrogation of Detainees Violate Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1717, 1719–21 (2007). 
 153. See generally John C. Crook, President Issues Executive Order Banning Torture and CIA Prisons, 
103 AM. J. INT’L L. 331 (2009); Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism Law Between the Executive and Legislative 
Models, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 877, 878 (2009) (observing that the Executive Orders issued by Obama in 
January 2009 did not make it clear that the Bush administration’s model of waging war on terrorism 
was necessarily changing). 
 154. Exec. Order – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations (Jan., 22, 2009), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/. See also Press Release, 
White House, Background: President Obama signs Executive Orders on Detention and Interrogation 
Policy (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
BACKGROUNDPresidentObamasignsExecutiveOrdersonDetentionandInterrogationPolicy/. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. See also Exec. Order – Review of Detention Policy Options (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/ReviewofDetentionPolicyOptions (creating a Special 
Interagency Task Force on Detainee Disposition); Greg Miller, CIA Retains Power to Abduct; Obama 
Preserves the Rendition Program, A Counter-terrorism Tool Whole Role, Officials Say, Might Expand, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at A1. 
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killings.”157 While the changes being made to specific programs may result in 
fewer instances of gross injustice, it must be noted that President Obama is 
simply issuing new Executive Orders and/or rescinding previous ones, not 
limiting the scope of executive power in any systematic way. 
 2.  Congressional Checks on Executive Power 
During World War II, Congress quickly criminalized failure to comply with 
military orders, funded the internment program, and subsequently passed 
legislation expanding the president’s detention authority.158 In the War on 
Terror, Congress has played a much more active role, passing hundreds of laws 
to implement executive policies. In the abstract, this would seem to alleviate 
some fears concerning the unilateral assertion of executive power, but it appears 
that in many instances Congress has been content to rubber stamp executive 
policy without careful consideration. 
Perhaps the most obvious example was the rapid passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, a 342-page bill introduced on October 23, 2001, approved by both 
the House and Senate, and signed into law just three days later, after Attorney 
General Ashcroft had threatened members of Congress that the blood of future 
victims would be on their hands if they delayed in passing the bill.159 Congress 
has been more than willing to follow the executive’s lead in stripping federal 
courts of jurisdiction over detainees held as “enemy combatants,” passing the 
Detainee Treatment Act, which purported to remove such detainees from the 
reach of the federal judiciary,160 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006,161 
which attempted to shield the commissions from both the Geneva Conventions 
and federal judicial review.162  
In both Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court 
refused to concede on the jurisdictional question, finding that detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay had the right to petition for writs of habeas corpus.163 What this 
history indicates is that, had the Supreme Court not been willing to at least 
preserve its jurisdiction to hear such cases, Congress would have willingly given 
the executive branch free rein to indefinitely detain individuals it believed to be 
dangerous, and to subject them, if and when it wished, to military tribunals 
without the most fundamental rights of due process. 
 
 157. See Ved Nanda, Introductory Essay: International Law Implications of the United States’ “War on 
Terror,” 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 513, 515–33 (2009). 
 158. See supra notes 68, 109 and accompanying text. 
 159. See CHANG, supra note 27, at 43; COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 95, at 151 (“It is virtually certain 
that not a single member of the House read the bill for which he or she voted.”); see also Alexandria R. 
Harrington, Presidential Powers Revisited: An Analysis of the Constitutional Powers of the Executive and 
Legislative Branches Over the Reorganization and Conduct of the Executive Branch, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
63, 81 (2007). See generally Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1145 (2004).  
 160. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–48, 119 Stat. 2739, 2741–43 (2005). 
 161. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 162. See Vladeck, The Long War, supra note 19, at 911–12. 
 163. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 
(2008); see also Vladeck, The Long War, supra note 19, at 912. See generally Marcia Pereia, The “War on 
Terror” Slippery Slope Policy: Guantánamo Bay and the Abuse of Executive Power, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 389 (2008). 
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In the rare instances where Congress did seek to impose certain limitations 
on executive power, a common response of the Bush administration was to use 
the president’s signing statements to narrow the reach of such legislation.164 For 
example, the 2006 Defense Appropriations Bill, introduced by Senator John 
McCain, was amended to include a ban on torture. In response, the president’s 
signing statement declared that the executive branch would construe the 
provision relating to the treatment of detainees “in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
branch as Commander-in-Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations 
on the judicial power.” The goal of this statement was to “preclude the Federal 
courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction” over judicial challenges to 
detention by those designated enemy combatants.165 
 3.  Judicial Responses 
The Supreme Court’s responses to recent detentions have not differed 
significantly from those of the Korematsu Court. As the Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan and 
Boumediene cases illustrate, the Supreme Court limited the Bush administration’s 
assertion of an unconstrained prerogative to detain persons by insisting that the 
detainees had a right to habeas corpus.166 However, it is not clear that the Court 
took any steps to narrow the precedent set by the Japanese American internment 
cases, for in those cases the right to petition for writs of habeas corpus was not at 
issue.167 The most problematic aspect of the World War II internment decisions 
was the Court’s refusal to review “the judgment of the military authorities and of 
Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number 
and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”168 Instead, as 
Rostow observed, “the Supreme Court undertook a review of its own 
intuitions. . . . There was no testimony or other evidence in the record as to the 
 
 164. See Manheim & Ides, supra note 144, at 28 (noting that in his first six years in office George 
W. Bush only vetoed one bill, but attached signing statements to 130 others). See also Paust, Above the 
Law, supra note 145, at 381 (quoting signing statement accompanying 2005 Defense Appropriations 
Act). See generally Malinda Lee, Reorienting the Debate on Presidential Signing Statements: The Need for 
Transparency in the President’s Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions of Power, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 705 (2008). 
 165. President’s Statement on Signing of Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Jun. 15, 2006). See generally Sofía E. 
Biller, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Hostility to the Operation of Checks and Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (2008); Michael T. Crabb, “The 
Executive Branch Shall Construe”: The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing 
Statement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 711 (2008). 
 166. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. 2229; Hamdan, 546 U.S. 1002; Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, (2004); Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). See generally Jordan J. Paust, Boumediene and Fundamental Principles of 
Constitutional Power, 21 REG. U. L. REV. 351 (2009) (finding the Court’s insistence that detainees 
retained a right to writs of habeas corpus as a rejection of uncontrolled executive power); but see Mark 
C. Rahdert, Double-Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons From Hamdi and Hamdan, 80 TEMP. L. 
REV. 451, 455 (2007) (arguing that the Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan cases “left the executive power 
baseline intact”). 
 167. The Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases were appeals of criminal convictions and Ex parte 
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), was heard on a writ of habeas corpus. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 81–103, 
135–51, 220–50, 319–41. 
 168. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944). 
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facts which governed the judgment of the military in entering the orders in 
question.”169 
In contemporary terms, this is referred to as “factual deference,” and 
usually involves assertions that because the executive has access to the facts “on 
the ground” it is best situated to make decisions concerning issues of military 
necessity. Thus, White House attorneys like John Yoo “based their case for an 
unconstrained executive on a set of fact-intensive policy arguments about the 
nature of the security threats today’s world presents,” arguing that 
contemporary threats are “qualitatively different from past security threats.”170 
Despite this purported reliance on the facts, concrete evidence concerning the 
detainees in the War on Terror has consistently been withheld on the basis of a 
claimed “state secrets” privilege,171 and although President Obama has 
acknowledged problems with the use of the privilege, his administration has 
continued to invoke it.172 Federal courts have not been any less deferential to 
claims of military necessity than was the Korematsu court.173 In the Hamdi case, 
the government’s primary claim was that the courts had no jurisdiction over 
Hamdi’s habeas petition because he was being held by the military, but it also 
argued that the judiciary should simply accept the government’s assertion that 
Hamdi was an enemy combatant.174 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
deferred unquestioningly to the government, holding that “[t]he executive is best 
prepared to exercise the military judgment attending the capture of alleged 
combatants,” and that judicial review of detention decisions “must not present a 
risk of saddling military decision-making with the panoply of encumbrances 
associated with civil litigation.”175 The Supreme Court’s plurality opinion, 
written by Justice O’Connor, seemed to modify this position somewhat, rejecting 
the government’s claim that the facts related to Hamdi’s capture were 
undisputed, and noting “that an unchecked system of detention carries the 
potential to become a means for oppression and abuse.”176 Nonetheless, as Eric 
Yamamoto observes, “in stark contrast to the tone of most of O’Connor’s 
 
 169. Rostow, supra note 1, at 506–07. 
 170. Pearlstein, supra note 148, at 548. 
 171. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing claims for 
rendition and torture based upon government’s assertion of state secrets privilege). See generally 
Stephanie A. Fichera, Note, Compromising Liberty for National Security: The Need to Rein in the 
Executive’s Use of the State-Secrets Privilege in Post-September 11 Litigation, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 
(2008); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Under Attack: The Public’s Right to Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 35 (2005). 
 172. See Michael O’Connor & Celia M. Rumann, Fanning the Flames of Hatred: Torture, Targeting, 
and Support for Terrorism, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 633, 635 n.11 (2009) (noting assertion of privilege in the 
an extraordinary rendition case in February 2009); see also Transcript of Obama’s remarks on security, 
May 21, 2009, available at www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/05/21/Transcript-of-Obamas-remarks-on-
security/UPI-12271242924426/(noting that the privilege has been “overused” but not rejecting it). 
 173. See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text; see generally Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a 
Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2005) (critiquing the 
judiciary’s “overwrought factual deference” in cases involving claims of military necessity). 
 174. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1367 (2009). 
 175. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2002). Subsequently, it rejected the district 
court’s finding that the government’s declaration of facts was insufficient and refused to order an 
evidentiary hearing. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 176. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004). 
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opinion, the Court backed down . . . announc[ing] that ‘enemy combatant 
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the 
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.’”177 
In the civil suit brought by Maher Arar, who was “rendered” to Syria by 
U.S. officials,178 the courts deferred to the executive branch before any facts had 
even been presented. The district court dismissed Arar’s complaint, saying that 
the “task of balancing individual rights against national-security concerns is one 
that courts should not undertake without the guidance or the authority of the 
coordinate branches. . . . Those branches have the responsibility to determine 
whether judicial oversight is appropriate.”179 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
treated the case as an immigration matter, precluding any remedy180 and 
prompting Owen Fiss to conclude that the judiciary thus “became complicit in 
the Administration’s assault on the Constitution.”181 
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE MISSING PIECE 
The dangers illustrated by the internment of Japanese Americans during 
World War II appear to be alive and well in post-9/11 America. If we wish to 
transform that reality, we cannot limit ourselves to resisting each new iteration of 
this pattern in a piecemeal fashion. Appealing to Congress, the executive, or even 
the courts to curb particular “excesses” or to enforce specific constitutional 
guarantees in a more effective manner still leaves Justice Jackson’s “loaded 
weapon” available to those who would utilize it in the future. This brings us to 
what I believe may be the most dangerous legacy of the Japanese American 
internment—the failure of all branches of government to acknowledge what 
actually happened, to take effective remedial measures, or to hold to account 
those responsible for acknowledged injustices. 
As Jerry Kang has documented, the Supreme Court did a remarkable job in 
the internment cases of “[letting] the military do what it will, keep[ing] its own 
hands clean, and forg[ing] plausible deniability for others.”182 Although the cases 
were self-evidently about the constitutionality of the detentions, the Court 
limited its holding in the Yasui and Hirabayashi cases to the legality of the 
 
 177. Eric Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to Hold the President 
Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 325 (2005) (quoting Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 533). Similarly, in United States v. Lindh, the district court found that John Walker Lindh’s 
claim to prisoner of war status was reviewable, but noted that the president’s factual decision should 
be given great deference and rejected the claim. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also Chesney, 
supra note 174, at 1373–76. 
 178. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F.Supp. 2d 250 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006); Nanda, supra note 154, at 530–31. See generally COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, supra note 89. 
 179. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d. at 283. 
 180. See Nanda, supra note 157, at 531; see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d at 163. 
 181. Fiss, Example of America, supra note 145. On the Supreme Court’s abdication of responsibility 
by virtue of refusing to hear critical cases, see Vladeck, Long War, supra note 19, at 913–17. See generally 
Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of Guantánamo Bay, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2009) (summarizing this 
history of executive actions and judicial responses). 
 182. Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 12, at 965. 
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curfew,183 and in Korematsu it bypassed the question of internment, approving 
the exclusion order as an extension of the curfew upheld in Hirabayashi.184 “This 
segmentation technique allowed the Court to obscure its own agency and 
thereby minimize responsibility for its choice.”185 
In ex parte Endo,186 decided at the same time as Korematsu, the issue of 
internment could no longer be avoided, for the only question was whether the 
government could continue to detain a U.S. citizen whom it conceded was 
“loyal.” The Court, which waited to issue its decision until President Franklin 
Roosevelt had been safely re-elected,187 found Mitsuye Endo’s continued 
detention unlawful, but managed to absolve both Congress and the president by 
claiming that the War Relocation Authority (“WRA”) had not been authorized to 
detain Endo.188 In turn, the lower federal court decisions vacating the convictions 
of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu held that the Supreme Court would 
have ruled differently in the 1940s, had the justices been aware that they were 
being misled by the government’s lawyers.189 
More than forty years after the fact, the Civil Liberties Act attributed the 
internment to a combination of wartime hysteria, racial prejudice, and a failure 
of political leadership. This legislation also provided an apology and $20,000 in 
compensation to each surviving internee.190 Despite the historic significance of 
this Act, and the enormous importance of the redress process to individual 
survivors and to the Japanese American community as a whole,191 the fact that 
the legislative debate and the apology it produced were couched in terms of the 
wholesale loyalty of Japanese Americans is problematic.192 Chris Iijima observed 
that, “[w]hile there was general agreement, at least rhetorically, on the injustice 
of the internment . . . [t]hose who, at the time of internment, saw it for the 
injustice and outrage that it was and chose to dissent continue to be silenced and 
unheralded even during the process of acknowledging their prescience.”193 As I 
 
 183. See Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 80 
(1943). 
 184. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 247 (1944). 
 185. Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 12, at 955. 
 186. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 187. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 344–45. 
 188. Kang, Watching the Watchers, supra note 14, at 260. 
 189. See id. at 263; Kang, Denying Prejudice, supra note 12, at 986; see also Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 190. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, supra note 13 (“As the Commission documents, these actions were 
carried out without adequate security reasons and without any acts of espionage or sabotage 
documented by the Commission, and were motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, 
and a failure of political leadership.”). On the fallacy of the “wartime hysteria” argument, see SAITO, 
CHINESE EXCLUSION, supra note 5, at 68–78. 
 191. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and 
Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 223 (1992). 
 192. See generally Chris K. Iijima, Reparations and the Model Minority Ideology of Acquiescence: The 
Necessity to Refuse to Return to the Original Humiliation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385 (1998); Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Beyond Reparations: Accommodating Wrongs or Honoring Resistance?, 1 HASTINGS RACE & 
POV. L.J. 27 (2003). 
 193. Iijima, Reparations, supra note 192, at 394. 
Saito_cpcxns.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2010  12:22:39 PM 
 INTERNMENTS, THEN AND NOW 99 
have argued elsewhere, the larger message that Congress seemingly intended to 
convey was that Japanese Americans should be rewarded for cooperating in our 
own incarceration, not that a wrong which should have been more widely 
resisted had occurred.194 
This Article began with Eugene Rostow’s question: “What are we to think of 
our own part in a program which violates every democratic social value, yet has 
been approved by the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court?”195 
Answering this question requires us to look not only at whether the institutions 
of government fulfilled their responsibilities under the Constitution, but whether 
the individual actors involved have been held accountable. 
In the case of the Japanese American internment, it seems quite clear that 
those most responsible were well-rewarded. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, 
who falsely claimed that evacuation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast 
was necessary despite the fact that the War Department had determined that 
there was “no threat of imminent attack,” and whose Final Report stated plainly 
that time was not an issue in assessing the loyalty of Japanese Americans,196 was 
subsequently appointed Commandant of the Army and Navy Staff College and, 
after his retirement, promoted to full general by a special act of Congress.197 Karl 
Bendetsen, the primary architect of the internment and author of DeWitt’s Final 
Report, was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Army in 1950 and 
Undersecretary in 1952, before leaving government to become a corporate 
executive.198 
Attorney General Francis Biddle, who was well aware of the problems with 
DeWitt’s report, went on to represent the United States at the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and later became a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
the Hague.199 Because DeWitt’s arguments contradicted the government’s 
position that evacuation was necessary as there was insufficient time to conduct 
loyalty hearings, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy ensured that the 
version of the Final Report made available to the Supreme Court was revised to 
eliminate the problematic language.200 He went on to become the founding 
president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“The 
 
 194. See Saito, Beyond Reparations, supra note 192, at 39. 
 195. See Rostow, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 196. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 208; CWRIC, supra note 8, at 66. 
 197. See John Lesesne DeWitt, Arlington National Cemetery Website, available at 
www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jldewitt.htm.  
 198. See generally KLANCY CLARK DE NEVERS, THE COLONEL AND THE PACIFIST: KARL BENDETSEN, 
PERRY SAITO, AND THE INCARCERATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II 103–09, 204–
16, 266–68 (2004). 
 199. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 280–84; Francis Beverly Biddle, in BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE BRANCH, 1774–1989 28 (Robert Sobel, ed., 1990); see also FRANCIS 
BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY: FROM THE YEARS WITH ROOSEVELT TO THE NÜRNBERG TRIAL 369–74 
(1962). 
 200. See CWRIC, supra note 8, at 83 (quoting memorandum of February 12, 1942 from Attorney 
General Francis Biddle to Secretary of War Henry Stimson); IRONS, supra note 109, at 207–12; see also 
J.L. DEWITT, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942 (1943); Gott, supra 
note 112, at 234. 
Saito_cpcxns.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2010  12:22:39 PM 
100 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE Vol. 2:71 2010 
World Bank”) and, later, a senior advisor to President Reagan.201 The Justice 
Department’s liaison to the WRA, Tom C. Clark, was first appointed Attorney 
General and eventually became a justice on the Supreme Court.202 
Part of the government’s legal strategy was to avoid disputes about the 
accuracy of the military’s assessments by having the courts take judicial notice of 
“facts” that were based upon unfounded presumptions about race and culture.203 
In turn, many of these “facts” had been generated by the media, most notably the 
press controlled by William Randolph Hearst,204 and groups such as the Native 
Sons of the Golden West, an organization dedicated to preserving California “as 
it has always been and as God himself intended it shall always be—the White 
Man’s Paradise.”205 In 1942, Earl Warren, then-Attorney General of California 
and a member of the Native Sons, coached the California Joint Immigration 
Committee—formerly known as the Asiatic Exclusion League—on how “to 
persuade the federal government that all ethnic Japanese should be excluded 
from the West Coast.”206 According to the CWRIC, “In DeWitt’s Final Report, 
much of Warren’s presentation to the [congressional committee preparing 
legislation to criminalize non-compliance with the military orders] was repeated 
virtually verbatim, without attribution. Warren’s arguments, presented after the 
signing of the Executive Order, became the central justifications presented by 
DeWitt for the evacuation.”207 Subsequently Warren was elected Governor of 
California in November 1942, twice reelected, and appointed Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court in 1953.208 
Even government attorneys who opposed the internment acquiesced in its 
implementation and participated in its defense. Edward Ennis, Director of the 
Alien Enemy Unit of the Justice Department, and Assistant Attorney General 
James R. Rowe Jr. both recognized the factual inaccuracies and constitutional 
problems inherent to the government’s arguments of “military necessity.” 
Nonetheless, as Rowe later stated, he managed to “convince Ennis that it was not 
important enough to make him quit his job.”209 
 
 201. See Obituary, John J. McCloy, Lawyer and Diplomat, Is Dead at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1989, 
available at www.nytimes.com/1989/03/12/obituaries/john-j-mccloy-lawyer-and-diplomat-is-dead-
at-93.html; see generally KAI BIRD, THE CHAIRMAN: JOHN J. MCCLOY AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT (1992). 
 202. See Tom Campbell Clark, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 112–
19 (Melvin I. Urofsky, ed., 1994). 
 203. See IRONS, supra note 109, at 137–40. 
 204. ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS, U.S.A.: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR II 
32–33 (1980). 
 205. See CWRIC, supra note 8, at 364 n.41. 
 206. See MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION 44–
47 (1949); see also ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN 
CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 24–29 (1968); CWRIC, supra note 8, at 33. 
 207. See CWRIC, supra note 8, at 98. On Warren’s role, see also Boris I. Bittker, Eugene V. Rostow, 
94 YALE L.J. 1315, 1319–20 (1985). 
 208. See Sumi K. Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a 
Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 73 (joint issue, 1998). 
 209. Quoted in IRONS, supra note 109, at 62. Asked in 1981 about Stimson’s and McCloy’s defense 
of the internment, Ennis responded, “These guys just acted as attorneys for the military authorities 
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With this sort of record, why would any public official, military leader, or 
government employee be deterred from engaging in comparable behavior? It 
remains unclear whether any officials will be held responsible for the detentions, 
abuse, and torture associated with the War on Terror that has been waged by the 
United States since 2001, but the signs are not propitious. 
The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee called for the removal 
of Civil Rights Commissioner Kirsanow following his defense of internment in 
2002.210 He was not removed, although apparently he did apologize, insisting 
that his remarks had been taken out of context.211 In January 2006, while 
Congress was in recess, President Bush appointed Kirsanow to the National 
Labor Relations Board.212 Congressman Coble expressed his “regret” that “many 
Japanese and Arab Americans found my choice of words offensive,” but ignored 
calls for his resignation as chair of the subcommittee on terrorism.213 
CIA Director “Leon Panetta announced at his confirmation hearing that CIA 
agents that engaged in torture, including waterboarding, in the early phases of 
the war against terrorism, would not be criminally prosecuted.”214 In fact, 
attorneys in the Obama administration have continued to rely “on the state secret 
doctrine and thus seem prepared to confer de facto immunity on the CIA for 
constitutional wrongs as gross as those entailed in extraordinary rendition.”215 
According to Attorney General Eric Holder, “It would be unfair to prosecute 
dedicated men and women working to protect America for conduct that was 
sanctioned in advance by the Justice Department.”216 
It appears unlikely that those who sanctioned the illegal or unconstitutional 
programs will be prosecuted. As Jordon Paust observed in 2007, the 
administration of George W. Bush had “furthered a general policy of impunity 
by refusing to prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes Act 
or alternative legislation, the torture statute, genocide legislation, and legislation 
permitting prosecution of certain civilians employed by or accompanying U.S. 
military forces abroad.”217 Shortly after Jay Bybee issued his torture 
memorandum in August 2002, President Bush appointed him to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and he was confirmed in March 2003.218 John Yoo, who 
 
and gave them whatever they asked for without any independent determination of its propriety . . . .” 
Id. at 350. 
 210. See Press Release, Press Release, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., supra note 29. 
 211. See Guillermo, supra note 29. 
 212. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Comm’r Kirsanow, http://www.usccr.gov/ 
cos/bio/kirsanow.htm. See also Michael T. Kirkpatrick and Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate 
Impact Claims Would Not Harm National Security—A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 503, 531 
(2009). 
 213. See California Legislature Rebukes, supra note 30. In 2008 he was reelected to a thirteenth term 
in the House of Representatives. See Official Biography of Congressman Howard Coble, 
http://coble.house.gov/Biography (last visited May 5, 2010). 
 214. Fiss, supra note 145, at 18. 
 215. Id. (citing Audio Recording: Oral Argument, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-
15693 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 216. Quoted in Jennifer Loven & Devlin Barrett, No charges for CIA torture, DESERET MORNING 
NEWS, April 17, 2009, at A01. 
 217. Paust, Above the Law, supra note 145, at 367–68 (citations omitted). 
 218. See Manheim & Ides, supra note 144, at 31 n.69. 
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drafted the torture memos, has returned to his law professorship at Boalt Hall.219 
The Obama Justice Department has rejected recommendations of ethics 
investigators concerning violations of professional standards by Bybee and 
Yoo.220 Although President Obama’s January 22 Executive Order “prohibits 
reliance on any Department of Justice or other legal advice concerning 
interrogation that was issued between September 11, 2001 and January 20, 
2009,”221 when questioned about possible prosecutions for torture, he has only 
emphasized the importance of looking forward, not backward.222 As things 
stand, then, there is no reasonable prospect of legal remedies for any of the 
wrongs associated with the so-called War on Terror. 
I believe we, as lawyers and legal scholars, have responsibilities distinct 
from those of documentary historians or moral theorists. It is a central tenet of 
the rule of law that legal rights without remedies are meaningless.223 If the legal 
system has permitted or facilitated legal wrongs, we have an obligation to ensure 
that effective remedies are implemented. In other words, it is necessary to 
address the question of accountability for injustice and, where there are 
consistent patterns replicating injustices, we must acknowledge that the remedies 
thus far employed have been inadequate. Otherwise, we are engaging not in 
legal analysis but alchemy. 
The injustices of the Japanese American internment were belatedly 
acknowledged and partial redress provided to some of its victims, but even these 
measures were couched in terms which exonerated the institutional and 
individual actors responsible for the wrongs at issue. This left the door open for 
the dangers posed by the internment to be replicated in the current War on 
Terror, and our failure to hold those accountable for contemporaneous wrongs 
will ensure that they, too, will be repeated in the future. 
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